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Judicial Archaeology:  
The Ninth Circuit Opinions of Justice Kennedy 
THE HONORABLE MARSHA BERZON† 
In preparation for this panel, I watched a tape of an interview with Justice 
Kennedy I participated in at a Ninth Circuit conference some years ago. Justice 
Kennedy made a revealing observation. He said, “I was in high school when 
Brown v. Board of Education1 came out. I thought to myself, that’s the end of 
prejudice and bias and we can now go on.”2 Justice Kennedy continued: “I 
thought to myself, my sister knows this because she will either be a secretary or 
a nurse.”3 What he was saying, of course, was he didn’t see that discrimination—
the stereotyping of women—at the time. His next sentence was, “The hardest 
thing to understand is the present.”4  
I empathize with that sentiment. People grow up in the context that they 
grow up in, with its cultural presumptions and blindness to the possibility of 
varying those presumptions. As Justice Kennedy’s comment suggests, there is 
sometimes a problem seeing what’s around you when you’ve grown up in a 
closed box; the box itself is not visible. The ability to perceive the present’s 
restrictions at least dimly and to sense what’s coming next—or at least that 
something different from the present may be coming next—is a character 
strength.  
To build on that theme, what I want to do today is a sort of archaeology. I 
want to look at some of Justice (then Judge) Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit opinions, 
see the degree to which they presage—or don’t—what he did on the Supreme 
Court, and perhaps draw a few lessons about these trajectories—about how 
 
 † Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Thank you to the editors of the Hastings 
Law Journal for helping me to uncover the Ninth Circuit opinions that I discuss, in particular Kelsey Constantin, 
Andrew Klair, Austin Shopbell, and Nina Gliozzo.  
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Conversation with the Justice, YOUTUBE (Aug. 30, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0g_T6ZPbHUU.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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people grow through time or, instead, how they continue to reiterate what 
they’ve done the first time.  
I am also going to venture a brief comment on a case of Justice Kennedy’s 
that no one has mentioned, Martinez v. Ryan.5 Federal judges are spending an 
inordinate amount of time right now with this case, which concerns when federal 
prisoners can bring habeas cases regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.6 
Martinez is on my mind because I heard three capital appeals this month. Much 
of the time in arguments and post-argument conferences in those hearings was 
taken up with asking, “What did Justice Kennedy mean in Martinez v. Ryan?” 
Martinez was a fairly creative opinion, one that I think also says something about 
what Justice Kennedy’s priorities were in criminal justice jurisprudence. 
So to begin: the title of this symposium refers to Justice Kennedy’s “Four 
Decades of Influence.” Thirteen years of those four decades were spent on the 
Ninth Circuit, 30 years were spent on the Supreme Court.  
There are obvious differences in the roles of Court of Appeal Judges and 
Supreme Court Justices. The mix of cases is very different. The ability to 
concentrate on the important ones is somewhat different. The degree of public 
attention is obviously inordinately different. And the ultimate direct impact on 
national legal doctrine is different. But, as I’m going to suggest, there is 
significant indirect national impact of Court of Appeals opinions, including that 
what is written in those opinions often later shows up in the Supreme Court as 
the law of the land. And the Ninth Circuit decides the vast majority of its cases 
without any Supreme Court intervention, so we’re responsible for developing 
legal doctrine unless and until the Supreme Court steps in.  
This Court of Appeals realm is the one in which Justice Kennedy was 
operating for thirteen years. (I did not overlap with him in the court, either as a 
law clerk—as he came on our court right after I finished clerking—or as a judge 
on the Ninth Circuit. I did get to know him somewhat later though, through Ninth 
Circuit conferences primarily.)  
The first case I am going to talk about is United States v. Finch,7 decided 
in 1976, right after Justice Kennedy began his stint on the Ninth Circuit. Finch 
held that there was no double jeopardy in retrying a defendant where the 
defendant entered into stipulated facts, the district court made a legal decision, 
and the government appealed.8 The theory was that since the district court’s 
ruling was simply a legal decision, the government could appeal. 
Finch is interesting to me, but probably was not terribly pleasing to then-
Judge Kennedy, because it was summarily reversed by the Supreme Court 
without an argument, in a one paragraph disposition issued very soon after the 
 
 5. 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
 6. Id. at 9–15. 
 7. 548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 8. Id. at 827.  
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Ninth Circuit decision.9 It must have been a bit discouraging to a new judge to 
have his handiwork disapproved of so disrespectfully. What’s interesting to me 
about the swift rejection of Finch is that the practice of summary reversals 
without argument has become fairly usual in the current Court. There are six or 
seven or eight of them a year. I wrote an opinion once explaining that summary 
reversals are a poor idea, because they are decided not only without argument 
but without briefing, and can reflect a limited understanding of the case as a 
whole.10 Certiorari petitions are not supposed to address the merits, but instead, 
whether or not the case deserves review by the Supreme Court. So, when 
reversing summarily, the Court may not know very much about the nuances of 
the facts and legal issues. It may well be that Justice Kennedy felt at the time of 
Finch that there was more to the case than the Supreme Court recognized. But 
as far as I know, he participated as a Supreme Court Justice in these summary 
reversals without complaining about them, even though he was a “victim” of the 
practice at the outset of his judicial career.  
The other thing that’s interesting about Finch is that the rest of the 
opinion—after the double jeopardy discussion—has a lengthy historical analysis 
about fishing rights on the Crow reservation.11 Because Justice Kennedy decided 
there wasn’t double jeopardy and the case was appealable, he reached the merits. 
Of course, the merits part of the Finch opinion was vacated, so it has never been 
controlling. I read one comment by an Indian rights litigator who said that had 
that opinion stood, Justice Kennedy would have been known as one of the great 
champions of Indian treaty rights.12 As it turned out, the Supreme Court later, in 
Montana v. United States, took a contrary view to Kennedy’s decision in 
Finch.13 Interestingly, just at the end of his tenure, Justice Kennedy recused in 
Washington v. United States,14 which was also about Indian fishing rights, 
because, digging back, he discovered that he had been on an earlier version of 
the case in the Ninth Circuit. So Indian fishing rights issues never went away 
during Justice Kennedy’s 40-year tenure.  
Finch also shows that some of the hardest work we do as judges ends up 
not having the influence it might because of fortuitous circumstances—here, the 
fact that there was a constitutional barrier to reaching the merits in the case, 
according to the Supreme Court.15 
The next case I am going to discuss was decided in 1979, Spain v. 
Procunier.16 (I am proceeding roughly chronologically.) Spain was a very well-
 
 9. See Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676, 677 (1977). 
 10. Visciotti v. Martel, 862 F.3d 749, 772, 774 (9th Cir. 2016) (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 11. Finch, 548 F.2d at 827–35.  
 12. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Indian Law Legacy, TURTLE TALK (June 29, 
2018), https://turtletalk.blog/2018/06/29/reflections-on-justice-kennedys-indian-law-legacy/. 
 13. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 554–55 (1981). 
 14. 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018). 
 15. Finch v. United States, 433 U.S. 676, 677 (1977). 
 16. 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). 
70.5-BERZON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2019  9:43 AM 
1178 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1175 
 
known case, at least in California. Justice Kennedy began the opinion by saying 
that this case “is difficult because it requires us to pass upon measures adopted 
by prison officials for the safe custody of some of the most dangerous men in 
the prison population.”17 There was a great deal of unrest in the California prison 
population during that time, much of it with a political tinge. Johnny Spain and 
some other participating prisoners were placed in solitary confinement, shackled 
severely everywhere they went, routinely subjected to tear gas, and denied any 
outdoor exercise.18 
Spain was an early Eighth Amendment prison conditions case, one that to 
my mind ties directly to Justice Kennedy’s later interest in prison conditions—
most obviously, his opinion in Brown v. Plata, approving a broad injunction 
designed to improve medical care in the California prison system.19 But there is 
also, along the same lines, Justice Kennedy’s quite extraordinary concurrence in 
Davis v. Ayala.20 He wrote a somewhat out-of-the-box concurrence explaining, 
in a case deciding only procedural issues, that solitary confinement was a harsh 
and disturbing practice, and inviting litigation on its constitutionality.21  
Spain v. Procunier seems to me to be the incubator for this set of concerns. 
Justice Kennedy said in Spain that “[u]nderlying the eighth amendment is a 
fundamental premise that prisoners are not to be treated as less than human 
beings.”22 That refrain ties into a notion somewhere at the core of Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence, and perhaps his worldview—the sense of everyone’s 
humanity, whatever the scope of each person’s legal protections may be.  
Also, in Spain, Justice Kennedy was very aware that the court’s judgment 
should be informed by current, enlightened scientific opinions as to the 
conditions necessary to ensure the physical and mental health of prisoners. I 
think that’s another refrain—an interest in expertise in what non-lawyers and 
non-judges are saying about things.23 The opinion was a very careful exegesis, 
going through each of the restraints, approving some of them and disapproving 
others, in a way fairly unusual for the time—especially given the high profile 
media attention to and fear of the California prison uprisings during that period.  
Then we have Flores v. Pierce.24 Although I had never heard of this 
opinion, I found it quite interesting to read—again, particularly in light of Justice 
Kennedy’s later Supreme Court opinions. Flores concerned a denial of business 
restaurant licenses in Calistoga, a city in the California wine country, to two 
 
 17. 600 F.2d at 192.  
 18. Id. at 192, 196, 199.  
 19. 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011). 
 20. 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 21. Id. at 2209–2210. 
 22. Spain, 600 F.2d at 200. 
 23. See id. (“It follows that when confronting the question whether penal confinement in all its dimensions 
is consistent with the constitutional rule, the court's judgment must be informed by current and enlightened 
scientific opinion as to the conditions necessary to insure good physical and mental health for prisoners.”). 
 24. 617 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1980).  
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businesses, one owned by a Hispanic and one not, but both of which had largely 
Hispanic clientele.25 In both instances, the local police protested the issuance of 
business licenses to these individuals to run restaurants and bars.26 The question 
in Flores was whether the license denials were unconstitutional because they 
were based on race.27 
The decision had a quite careful and interesting approach to how one finds 
discriminatory intent. Flores was decided after Washington v. Davis28 and 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,29 so 
a disparate impact Equal Protection theory was not available. Instead, the 
plaintiffs had to prove discriminatory animus. Justice Kennedy emphasized as 
critically important the fact that these were the only two licenses that had been 
protested—that is, the disparate impact was of enormous relevance in proving 
intent, even if not controlling.30 He also emphasized that the defendant city 
officials “deviated from previous procedural patterns” in denying these business 
licenses.31 
I also thought it interesting, in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. 
Civil Rights Commission32 that in Flores, Justice Kennedy saw evidence of 
pretext or animus in the city officials’ statements that their concerns were with 
“the desirability of the applicant” and keeping the town on a “good level.”33 He 
read those statements, quite sensitively, as indicating that the race or ethnicity 
of the applicants was relevant to whether they would be issued a business 
license.34 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy similarly attributed a 
discriminatory motive, in that case against religion, from the statements of 
adjudicators as to why they were deciding as they were.35 I also wondered a bit 
how Flores dovetailed with the Supreme Court travel ban case Trump v. 
Hawaii.36 Justice Kennedy’s sensitivity to motive was perhaps less apparent in 
the Trump case, although the immigration context may explain the difference.37 
 
 25. Id. at 1388. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting a disparate impact Equal Protection claim and holding that a showing 
of intentional discrimination is required for claims of discrimination under the Equal Protection clause). 
 29.  429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977) (same).  
 30. Id. at 1390. 
 31. Id. at 1389. 
 32. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 33. Flores, 617 F.2d at 1390 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. Id. (“[T]he jury may well have concluded . . . that the explanations given by the defendants for their 
actions were simply pretexts to conceal an intent to act upon stereotypic classifications which resulted from a 
racial animus.”). 
 35. 138 S. Ct. at 1731–32. 
 36. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 37. Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Next, and really fascinating, is Beller v. Middendorf,38 decided in 1980. 
Beller, in which Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion, upheld the Navy’s policy 
precluding gays from serving in the Navy.39 Matt Coles, who is here, was a 
lawyer in Beller; he told me at lunch today that despite that holding, Beller was 
regarded by the LGBT legal community as a somewhat hopeful opinion. Beller 
does have passages where glimmers of Justice Kennedy’s later views in Romer 
v. Evans,40 Lawrence v. Texas,41 United States v. Windsor,42 and Obergefell v. 
Hodges43 with regard to LGBT rights come through. 
Justice Kennedy began the substantive part of Beller thus: “We recognize 
that to many persons the regulations may seem unwise.”44 Perhaps at that time, 
in 1980, to many people the Navy’s policy did not seem so unwise, but that is 
where Justice Kennedy started. Justice Kennedy then spent a lot of time in Beller 
outlining his understanding of the limits of the judicial role. (As an aside, I note 
that from my reading of the set of opinions I am discussing, Justice Kennedy 
seemed to run hot and cold as to the importance of a limited judicial role. 
Sometimes he was very concerned with describing such limits, and other times, 
as I will explain in a bit, he emphasized that the judiciary must step in when 
there is a political stalemate or incursions on the judiciary.)  
Justice Kennedy also stated in Beller, again while upholding the Navy’s 
gay exclusion policy, that “we can concede . . . that the reasons which led the 
Court to protect certain private decisions intimately linked with one’s 
personality and family living arrangements beyond the core nuclear family 
suggest that some kinds of government regulation of private consensual 
homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge.”45 He went 
on to say that, here, the state did not “seek[] to use its criminal processes to 
coerce persons to comply with a moral precept even if they are consenting adults 
acting in private without injury to each other,”46—that is, the facts of the 
Lawrence case.47 So all the seeds of Lawrence are quite evident in Beller, even 
though, in the end, Beller says, essentially, because it’s a military policy, we are 
going to approve the ban on gays.48 
Beller is additionally another opinion in which Justice Kennedy’s 
observation that it’s hard to understand the present has resonance. Justice 
 
 38. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), overruled by, Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 39. Id. at 792. 
 40. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 41. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 42. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 43. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 44. 632 F.2d at 792.  
 45. Id. at 810 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)). 
 46. Beller, 632 F.2d at 810. 
 47. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003). 
 48. Beller, 632 F.2d at 812. 
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Kennedy said in Beller that the Navy’s concerns have a “basis in fact.”49 What 
were those concerns? They’re articulated as, first, “tensions and hostilities” that 
will arise from allowing gays to serve in the Navy because the great majority of 
naval personnel “despise/detest homosexuality,”50 and, second, that there’s 
going to be an adverse impact on recruiting, because parents will not want their 
children “associating with individuals who are incapable of maintaining high 
moral standards.”51 After stating that these concerns have a “basis in fact,”52 the 
opinion looped back, opining that “[u]pholding the challenged regulations as 
constitutional is distinct from a statement that they are wise. . . . It should be 
plain from our opinion that the constitutionality of the regulations stems from 
the needs of the military.”53 
This back-and-forth drafting looks like the beginning of an internal 
struggle within Justice Kennedy as to the issue of gay rights and the 
constitutional doctrines applicable to address them. Beller even had some 
discussion of the levels of scrutiny applicable to this kind of discrimination.54 
So the Beller opinion is a forerunner of the recurring tension in Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence between upholding personal liberty and observing a 
constrained role of the court vis-à-vis other governmental institutions.  
Next up is Chadha v. INS.55 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chadha, a 
lengthy and scholarly opinion by Justice Kennedy, was upheld in the Chadha 
Supreme Court opinion in which Chief Justice Burger wrote, over only one 
dissent (by Justice White), that a unicameral congressional veto is 
unconstitutional.56 Chadha concerned a statute that provided that whenever the 
immigration court provided an exception to deportation for hardship, the ruling 
had to be sent to Congress, and either house could veto it.57 So Chadha 
concerned a unicameral, purely congressional decision reversing an 
administrative adjudication. The Supreme Court opinion by Chief Justice Burger 
focuses exclusively on the interference with bicameralism and with the role of 
the president.58  
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit in Chadha is, in my view, 
much more interesting than Justice Burger’s later version, although the result 
was the same. Justice Kennedy’s Chadha opinion was a lengthy exegesis on the 
importance of the separation of powers within the federal government. The 
opinion cites Madison, Jefferson, Adams, Montesquieu, and seemingly, every 
 
 49. Id. at 811. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 811 n.22.  
 52. Id. at 812 (“These considerations are adequate to sustain the regulation in its military context.”). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 807. 
 55. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d sub nom., 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
 56. 462 U.S. at 944–59. 
 57. Id. at 923–24. 
 58. See generally id. 
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other pre-twentieth century eminence one can think of.59 There were long quotes 
from the Federalist Papers, to underscore that the goal of preventing the undue 
concentration of power is to protect against dangers to liberty.60 This emphasis 
on the connection between both federalism and separation of powers within the 
federal government on the one hand, and protecting individual liberty on the 
other, became a recurring Kennedy theme. Justice Kennedy also wrote in 
Chadha that the judiciary is the key governmental mechanism for avoiding 
stalemates.61 He said that one possibility would be for the judiciary to suggest 
that the executive branch stop the Congress from exceeding its authority, but, 
said Justice Kennedy in his Ninth Circuit Chadha opinion, that’s not what we 
do. Instead, questions of separation of powers go to the judiciary, and the 
judiciary decides which of the other two branches should prevail. What’s notable 
is the ambition of the Kennedy Chadha opinion—it reads like an application to 
be a Supreme Court Justice. The Supreme Court affirmance was much more 
modest (even though it was accused by the dissent of being too expansive62).  
Where are the echoes of the Ninth Circuit Chadha opinion in Justice 
Kennedy’s Supreme Court jurisprudence? Perhaps in Bush v. Gore’s63 notion 
that the judiciary sometimes just has to take over—that is, the belief that at some 
point, the courts have no choice but to step in to readjust the political system. 
But in Bush v. Gore, unlike in Chadha, there were other obvious possibilities, as 
the various dissents indicated.  
Finally, Graham v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue64 was a Free 
Exercise clause opinion demonstrating how much Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause law has moved since the 1980s, and Justice Kennedy with 
it. Several members of the Church of Scientology challenged on the basis of the 
Free Exercise and Establishment clauses the refusal of the IRS to allow them to 
take charitable deductions for the way in which they provided money to the 
Church of Scientology.65 Scientology members are charged a fixed donation for 
training and “auditing” required by the church.66 Because there was a quid pro 
quo for the contributions to the church, the payments did not qualify as charitable 
contributions.67 
The plaintiffs in Graham insisted that the doctrine of exchange was part of 
their religion.68 Justice Kennedy’s opinion at first took issue with that assertion, 
 
 59. 634 F.2d at 421.  
 60. See, e.g., id. at 434.  
 61. Id. at 423.  
 62. Chada, 462 U.S. at 983 (White, J., dissenting). 
 63. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 64. 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 65. Id. at 846–48. 
 66. Id. at 847. 
 67. Id. at 848. 
 68. “One of the tenets of Scientology is that any time a person receives something, he must pay something 
back. This is called the doctrine of exchange.” Id. at 847. 
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saying he didn’t think there was any prohibition on their actually giving 
donations.69 But aside from that, Graham said, even if these transactions are 
central to the practice of their scientologists’ religion, the government interest in 
a neutral and enforceable taxation system is compelling and outweighs any 
burden on religious beliefs.70 Graham stressed, in particular, the cost of creating 
exemptions for taxes.71 
Justice Kennedy in Graham seems to take a much narrower view of the 
freedom of religion than, for example, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.72 
suggested more recently, indicating a shift in his position regarding the 
preeminence of religious objectors’ interests. Perhaps that shift may reflect the 
ascendance of evangelical religion as a political and social force, leading to 
fervent Supreme Court advocacy for religious exceptions to governmental 
regulation.  
That review of some of Justice Kennedy’s opinions when he was Judge 
Kennedy completes my archaeological project. I have not discussed Ninth 
Circuit opinions dealing with economic and commercial issues, as Justice 
Kennedy’s views on those issues have been both more consistent—usually 
favoring business litigants—and less interesting. The last opinion I want to 
discuss is Martinez v. Ryan.73  
Martinez was something of a tour de force. The prior law had held that 
there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel in post-conviction 
review proceedings.74 Because there is no such constitutional right, the 
ineffectiveness of a lawyer in state post-conviction review proceedings is 
ordinarily not a ground for excusing a procedural default. In other words, if the 
state post-conviction review lawyer doesn’t raise an issue not litigated on appeal, 
there is a procedural default and the prisoner cannot raise the issue on federal 
habeas. 
When Martinez was argued in the Supreme Court, the lawyers accepted 
this framework but argued that there was some limited constitutional right to 
lawyers in state post-conviction review proceedings—where that review was the 
first time that the petitioner could raise ineffective assistance in the trial court. 
What is so interesting about Martinez is that Justice Kennedy’s opinion walked 
away from the framework presented by the parties. The opinion did not decide 
that there is a constitutional right to lawyers in post-conviction review 
proceedings. Instead, the opinion held as an equitable matter that a petitioner 
gets at least one shot at an ineffective assistance claim regarding the trial. So it’s 
not a procedural default for federal habeas purposes if trial counsel’s 
 
 69. Id. at 850. 
 70. Id. at 853.  
 71. Id.  
 72. 537 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 73. 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
 74. Id. at 8 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)). 
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ineffectiveness was not raised because post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective.75 But a petitioner doesn’t have a constitutional right to have a post-
conviction lawyer.76 Whether Justice Kennedy invented this compromise 
position up or where exactly it came from, I don’t know. As I read the oral 
argument in Martinez, no party presented the problem in the case that way.77 
Justice Kennedy may have completely underestimated, though, how often 
and to what degree the Martinez rule would impact the litigation of capital cases. 
Martinez comes up before the Ninth Circuit in half the capital habeas cases we 
have, it seems. And applying Martinez in diverse situations has proved 
something of a challenge, dividing our court repeatedly.78 
Martinez provides some additional keys to Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisprudential tendencies. First of all, Justice Kennedy wasn’t always enamored 
of procedural technicalities. The notion that criminal defendants whose lawyers 
had failed them should be heard in court was important enough to him to justify 
the creation of an innovative doctrine. Secondly, at the bottom of the problem in 
Martinez is an appreciation of the importance of lawyers—a criminal defendant 
should have at least one shot at a competent lawyer. I think that theme—that 
effective lawyering is essential to competent judicial decision-making—is one 
that resonates as well.  
I am reminded, in that connection, of a recurring conversation between 
Justice Kennedy and my husband Stephen Berzon at the Ninth Circuit’s annual 
conferences (which Justice Kennedy faithfully attends). Each year, Justice 
Kennedy would ask Stephen whether he is still a practicing lawyer. And each 
year, when Stephen said yes, Justice Kennedy would say that practicing law in 
California was the best job he ever had. Perhaps that affection for the practice of 
law—for the need to connect with diverse clients and creatively represent their 
interests—explains some of the traits my archaeology has uncovered—including 
the effort to peek, albeit tentatively and cautiously, outside the “present” in 
which we are all captive.  
 
 75. Id. at 14, 17–18. 
 76. Id. at 16; see also id. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 77. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (No. 10-1001). 
 78. See, e.g., Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (four separate opinions interpreting 
Martinez, none of which commanded a majority of the eleven judge panel); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 
(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (considering Martinez with five separate opinions). A later Ninth Circuit decision 
described the fractured Detrich opinions, noting that “[a]n opinion by Judge W. Fletcher announced the 
judgment, but that opinion was joined in full by only two other judges (Judges Pregerson and Reinhardt). Another 
judge (Judge Christen) concurred in section II of Judge Fletcher's opinion and also the result. Judges Nguyen 
and Watford each concurred in the result, and each wrote a separate opinion. Judge Graber authored a dissent, 
joined in full by four other judges (Chief Judge Kozinski and Judges Gould, Bea, and Murguia).” Clabourne v. 
Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 375 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by, McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc). 
